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ABSTRACT
Fraud is a multi-billion dollar industry that continues to grow annually. Many
organizations are poorly prepared to prevent and detect fraud. Fraud detection
strategies are intended to quickly and efficiently identify fraudulent activities
that circumvent preventative measures. In this paper, we adopt a DesignScience methodological framework to develop a model for detection of vendor
fraud based on analysis of patterns or signatures identified in enterprise system
audit trails. The concept is demonstrated by developing prototype software.
Verification of the prototype is achieved by performing a series of
experiments. Validation is achieved by independent reviews from auditing
practitioners. Key findings of this study are: (a) automating routine data
analytics improves auditor productivity and reduces time taken to identify
potential fraud; and (b) visualizations assist in promptly identifying potentially
fraudulent user activities. The study makes the following contributions: (a) a
model for proactive fraud detection; (b) methods for visualizing user activities
in transaction data; and (c) a stand-alone Monitoring and Control Layer (MCL)
based prototype.
Keywords: fraud detection, enterprise system, SAP, vendor fraud, continuous
monitoring, audit trails, visualisation, data analytics
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1. INTRODUCTION
According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) Report to
the Nations on Occupational Fraud & Abuse, "a typical organization loses five
percent of its annual revenue to fraud. Applied to the estimated 2011 Gross
World Product of $70.28 trillion, this figure translates to a potential total fraud
loss of more than $3.5 trillion" (ACFE, 2012, p. 8). These figures are clear
evidence that fraud is a major problem, which requires serious study by
researchers to minimize illegal activities.
There are two principal methods of getting something from others illegally.
They can either be physically forced, or they can be deceived into giving up
their assets. The first type is called robbery and the second is fraud. Albrecht et
al. (2009) defines fraud as a deception made for personal gain. Deception is
key. The most common definition of fraud according to Webster's Dictionary
(2001, p. 380) is:
Fraud is a generic term that embraces all the multifarious
means which human ingenuity can devise, which are resorted
to by one individual, to get an advantage over another by false
representations. No definite and invariable rule can be laid
down as a general proposition in defining fraud, as it includes
surprise, trickery, cunning and unfair ways by which another
is cheated. The only boundaries defining it are those which
limit human knavery.
The ACFE (2010, p. 6) defines occupational fraud as:
…the use of one's occupation for personal enrichment through
the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing
organization's resources or assets…
Occupational fraud is very broad and it encompasses a range of transgressions
by employees at all levels of an organisational hierarchy. These include: (a)
asset misappropriations, which involve theft or misuse of an organisation's
assets; (b) corruption, in which employees wrongfully use their influence in
business transactions to gain some benefit for themselves or another person,
contrary to their duty to their employer; and (c) fraudulent statements, which
usually involve falsification of an organisation's financial statements.
Fraud can be committed by anyone. Perpetrators cannot usually be
distinguished from other people on the basis of demographic or psychological
factors. Individuals involved in fraud are regular people that have
compromised their integrity and become involved in fraud (Cressey, 1953).
Several theories exist in the literature as to why individuals commit frauds. A
common theme in each of the theories is one of conflict of interest. If this
situation arises between the owner(s) and employees, it may lead to
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dissatisfaction among employees. Affected employees may seek relief by
resorting to fraudulent behaviour when an opportunity presents itself (Fama
and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Owners incur costs in order to monitor opportunistic behaviour of employees.
By implementing an accounting system, owners are able to leverage an
essential in-built business function of providing adequate controls to safe guard
organisational assets. An accounting system provides a means of implementing
and improving the internal control structure of an organisation. An effective
accounting system provides an audit trail that allows frauds to be discovered
and makes concealment difficult. Potential fraud can be discovered in
accounting records by examining transactions that are anomalous or appear
otherwise unreasonable (Albrecht et al., 2009; Romney and Steinbart, 2009).
With advances in information technology and emergence of electronic
business, modern enterprise systems may record millions of transactions
annually. An auditor may extract a small sample of these during a financial
audit. Suppose a fraudster perpetrates only a few frauds annually, it is plausible
that none of them may be discovered by the financial audit. Many fraudsters
rely on this to conceal fraud. Thus, while opportunities to commit fraud
continue to increase, it appears that insufficient resources are being deployed to
improve detection using internal controls (Figure 1).

Figure 1 Fraud Detection Methods (ACFE, 2010)

Implementing a well-designed internal control policy enables an organization
to reduce opportunities for employees to commit occupational fraud. Further
reduction in fraud may be achieved by introducing proactive fraud detection
mechanisms that use computer-based technology (Broady and Roland, 2008) to
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monitor and analyze business processes at an "unprecedented level of detail"
(Alles, et al., 2006, p. 138).
This study adopts a Design-Science methodological framework (Hevner et al.,
2004) to answer the key research question: Can a generalised model for
proactive detection of vendor fraud in enterprise systems be developed? The
remainder of this paper is organised as follows: scope of the study;
methodology used; conceptual model; development of a framework for fraud
detection; approaches for continuous monitoring and fraud detection; research
propositions; level of support enterprise systems provide for fraud detection;
design and development of automated fraud detection strategies; validation of
prototype; and discussion of some limitations and future research.
2. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
When considering an automated solution for proactive fraud detection, the
focus has to be on questions that can be answered with the aid of computerised
tools (Lanza, 2007). Some questions are too subjective, for example, Are the
vendor's goods or services of good quality? Any effort to develop an
automated solution will require evidence that is documented in an enterprise
system's audit trails and that can be investigated using data analytics tools.
Transactions that occur outside an enterprise system cannot be investigated
using this methodology.
The ACFE (2010) classifies occupational fraud into three broad categories;
asset misappropriation, corruption and fraudulent statements. Asset
misappropriation is the most common category of fraud perpetrated by nonmanagement employees, occurring in more than 86% of all cases (Table 1).
The median loss from asset misappropriation was $135,000. (Note: the sum of
percentages in Table 1 exceeds 100% because several cases involved schemes
from more than one category).
Table 1 Categories of Occupational Fraud and Abuse (ACFE, 2010)

Category
Asset Misappropriation
Corruption
Fraudulent Statements

% of all Cases
86.3%
32.8%
4.8%

Median Loss
$135,000
$250,000
$4,100,000

Asset misappropriation schemes involve theft of cash and non-cash assets.
Cash assets are more frequently targeted than non-cash assets. Billing schemes
was the most common method used to misappropriate cash assets (26%)
having a median loss of $128,000 (Table 2).
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Table 2 Sub-Categories of Asset Misappropriation (ACFE, 2010)

Category
Billing
Non-Cash Misappropriations
Expense Reimbursements
Skimming
Cheque Tampering
Cash on Hand
Misappropriations
Cash Larceny
Payroll
Cash Register Disbursements

% of all Cases
26.0%
16.3%
15.1%
14.5%
13.4%
12.6%
9.8%
8.5%
3.0%

Median Loss
$128,000
$90,000
$33,000
$60,000
$131,000
$23,000
$100,000
$72,000
$23,000

Large scale implementations of enterprise systems have resulted in many
organisations being highly automated and fully integrated. The development of
this enterprise system environment provides the necessary infrastructure for the
effective evolution of the auditing function from a periodic event to an ongoing
process through the use of computer-based technology. Enterprise systems
software are available from several vendors, including SAP, Oracle and
Microsoft, and collectively has 71% of market share world-wide. For several
years, however, Germany-based enterprise software company SAP has
consistently been the market leader (Lager and Tsai, 2008; SAP, 2010). In
2010, Gartner (2010) recognised SAP as the leading vendor of enterprise
systems software accounting for 22% of the market. Many organisations have
realised that SAP solutions are important to their success. Several Fortune 500
companies, including IBM, Toyota, Apple, Coca-Cola, and Google use SAP
exclusively for their core day to day operations including accounting and
financial applications, procurement, order processing and supplier
management, inventory management, and HR management and payroll
functions (BOS, 2009; CMU 2011; Gartner, 2010). The prototype developed in
this research exploits SAP audit trails for proactive detection of vendor fraud
schemes.
The scope of this study is therefore limited to detection of vendor fraud
schemes involving shell companies and non-accomplice vendors in an SAP
enterprise system using prototype software developed for this purpose. The
study makes no claims to be able to identify any 'actual' fraudulent activities
but is limited to extracting data that provide symptomatic evidence that
fraudulent activities might have occurred. Throughout this study the term
fraud, fraud detection, or fraud detection tool means potential fraud not actual
fraud. In the next section, we discuss the methodology adopted by this study.
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3. METHODOLOGY
This study adopts Hevner et al. (2004) Design-Science methodological
framework. The framework requires creation of an innovative, purposeful
artefact (guideline 1) for a specified problem domain (guideline 2). Evaluation
of the artefact is crucial (guideline 3). The artefact must be innovative
(guideline 4) and rigorously designed and evaluated (guideline 5). It must enact
an effective solution to a problem space (guideline 6) and results of the
research must be presented effectively to both technology- and managementoriented audiences (guideline 7). This study adopts the following methodology:
1. Literature review – to recognise theories and concepts that underpin
this study (guidelines 1, and 2).
2. Create a catalogue of fraud symptoms (guidelines 1, 2, and 4).
3. Identify data requirements to detect fraud in an SAP Enterprise System
(guidelines 2, 3, 4, and 6).
4. Design, develop, and implement prototype software (guidelines 1, 2, 4,
and 5).
5. Perform experiments to verify program functionality of the prototype
(guidelines 3, 6, and 7).
6. Seek support from experts for validation of the prototype (guideline 7).
The primary objective of this study is to explore and develop innovative
methods for proactively detecting vendor fraud in enterprise systems. The
intention is to build a model for detection of vendor fraud based on analysis of
patterns or signatures. This study adopts a methodology for proactive fraud
detection that exploits audit trails in enterprise systems. The concept is
demonstrated by developing a prototype. The aim of the prototype is to
confirm the feasibility of implementing proactive vendor detection in practice.
The prototype is a software application that analyses transaction data from an
SAP enterprise system for indicators of vendor fraud. Reports and
visualisations highlighting anomalous activities are produced. Further
investigation of these findings may be initiated at the discretion of an auditor.
A conceptual model for the study is developed in the next section.
4. CONCEPTUAL MODEL
The conceptual model for this study (Figure 2) incorporates Albrecht et al.’s
(2009) essential steps in detecting fraudulent activities:







understanding the business or operations.
performing a risk analysis to identify the types of frauds that can occur.
cataloguing the symptoms that the most likely frauds would generate.
using computer technology to identify fraud symptoms.
analysing the results.
investigating suspicious transactions.
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Figure 2 Conceptual Fraud Model

The model represents the fundamental nature of fraud and its detection. Firstly,
the model incorporates factors that motivate an individual to perpetrate fraud.
It identifies mental states that fraudsters experience prior to perpetrating frauds.
A fraudster may mentally enact several fraud scenarios until a suitable one is
found. Once a fraudster determines what to steal, the next decision is how to
steal it. A fraudster has to determine a specific method of perpetrating fraud.
The chosen method may entail a series of steps taken to achieve the desired
outcome of perpetrating a fraud and concealing it to avoid detection. The key
concept identified in this part is opportunity. Secondly, the model focuses on
detection of vendor fraud in an organisation. This is achieved by:





Creation of a catalogue of fraud symptoms.
Translation of fraud symptoms into detection strategies that can be
implemented in a prototype.
Design and development of a prototype.
Experiments performed with enterprise system data.

The conceptual model provides an understanding of the nature of fraud
symptoms and its detection in enterprise systems. Fraud is a complex social
condition that evolves from underlying factors such as dissatisfaction or
despair. The eventual outcome is that an individual is motivated to
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misappropriate assets that belong to an organisation. In the next section, we
develop a framework for detecting fraud.
5. FRAMEWORK FOR DETECTING FRAUD
Perpetration of vendor fraud may require the creation of a shell company and
the submission of fictitious invoices to an organisation for payment (Best et al.,
2009; O'Gara, 2004; Wells, 2002a). To successfully perpetrate this type of
fraud, the fraudster needs to access to the following enterprise system elements
(Best et al., 2009; Narayan, 2008; Padhi, 2010):



Creation or modification of vendor master records.
Invoice entry sub-system.

Vendor master records can be created or modified in the following ways (Best,
2008; O'Gara, 2004; Singleton et al., 2008):





Create a fake vendor.
Temporarily modify an existing vendor (flipping).
Permanently modify an existing vendor.
Use a one-time account.

Invoices can be entered in an enterprise system in the following ways (Best,
2005; Singleton et al., 2008):




Create a fake invoice.
Use a legitimate invoice.
Create or use a duplicate invoice.

Key components of the framework for vendor fraud detection include defining
data requirements for fraud detection; and creating a catalogue of fraud
symptoms. The catalogue of fraud symptoms comprises critical combinations
of user activities and known vendor fraud symptoms.
5.1 Critical Combinations
Many frauds occur because fraudsters exploit the lack of internal controls or
they may override existing internal controls that are poorly implemented. For
example, an employee that creates or modifies a vendor master record should
not be able to enter an invoice. Having this capability does not indicate that a
fraud has taken place, but it does create an opportunity for fraud to be
perpetrated. By detecting these critical combinations of user activities:



an auditor can further investigate transactions that match known fraud
symptoms, or appear otherwise anomalous, and
an organisation can take steps to correct the situation thereby reducing
the probability of future fraud.
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The concept of separating critical business activities in order to reduce fraud is
termed segregation of duties. In its simplest form, the Segregation of Duties
(SoDs) principle states that sensitive tasks should be divided into two or more
steps with each step being performed by a different user (Li et al., 2007). This
study supports the following principles of SoDs within the accounts payable
function as proposed by Little and Best (2003):



SoDs principle 1: users who can create and modify master records
should not be able to post transactions.
SoDs principle 2: payments should be performed by someone other
than the person who enters vendor invoices.
5.2 Known Vendor Fraud Symptoms

Vendor fraud schemes occur when a fraudster causes an organization to issue a
payment by submitting invoices for fictitious goods or services, inflated
invoices, or invoices for personal purchases. Activities that violate segregation
of duties are indicators of potential fraud and require further investigation.
These activities may be investigated to determine whether they match known
vendor fraud symptoms, or appear otherwise anomalous. Methods to detect
several known vendor fraud symptoms are specified in Table 3.
In the next section, we identify and describe two major approaches to
continuous monitoring and fraud detection.
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Table 3 Methods to Detect Known Vendor Fraud Symptoms
(Best et al., 2009; Lanza, 2003; Wells, 2008)
Symptom

General Detection Strategy

Change in vendor payment details followed
by a change back to the original after a
short time (flipping) and payments are
made in the interim period

Detect changes to vendor master data
that result in a vendor having different
bank details over a period of time.
Payments of invoices are made in the
interim period. Previous bank details are
subsequently reinstated after being
updated with new details.

Duplicate transactions

Check if the same payment details are
used by more than one vendor.

Invoices with round dollar amounts

Extract all invoices with round dollar
amounts (e.g., $1000.00).

Invoices with amounts consistently below
approval limit

Extract all vendors with multiple
invoices below approval limit (e.g.,
several $999 payments to vendor when
limit is $1000).

Vendors with payments that exceed their
12-month average by a significant amount

Extract all vendors where payments
exceed 12-month average by a
percentage e.g., 200%.

Vendors with payments exceeds the last
largest payment by a significant amount

Extract all vendors where payment is
larger than the last largest payment by a
percentage e.g., 200%.

Vendors with similar names

Extract all vendors whose names are
similar to other companies.

Vendors that become active after long
periods of being dormant

Extract all vendors that become active
after long periods of inactivity.

Same vendor having different payment
details

Extract all vendors with multiple master
records, each having different payment
details.
Check for multiple payments using
different bank account details.

Multiple vendors sharing the same
payment details

Extract all vendors that share the same
payment details.

6. APPROACHES FOR CONTINUOUS MONITORING AND FRAUD
DETECTION
Automated fraud detection requires continuous monitoring of an organisations
transaction data. Continuous monitoring increases the probability of detecting
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fraudulent activities (Coderre and Warner, 1999; Potla, 2003). The traditional
or manual audit approach is limited because it reviews only a small percentage
of a large population of transactions. Large accounting data files with several
thousands of transactions are difficult to analyse or monitor manually in realtime. The alternative therefore is to automate this process by using information
technology (Broady and Roland, 2008).
Continuous monitoring is a way to provide constant monitoring and
surveillance of transaction data in a real or near real-time basis against a set of
predetermined rule sets (Kuhn Jr. and Sutton, 2010). It enables auditors to
provide a degree of assurance on information shortly after disclosure (Rezaee
et al., 2002). It is a step in the path of the evolution of the financial audit from
manual to computer-based methods. These systems analyse data and search for
specific patterns or combination of activities. Potentially fraudulent activities
can therefore be identified shortly after they occur. Widespread adoption of
computer-based accounting information systems in general, and Enterprise
Resource Planning (ERP) systems in particular, has contributed to the
increasing demand for continuous monitoring (Vasarhelyi et al., 2004).
However, presently only 2.6% of organisations use data monitoring to
proactively detect fraud (ACFE 2010) (Figure 1).
Two major approaches to continuous monitoring exist. These are Embedded
Audit Modules (EAMs), and Monitoring and Control Layer (MCL).
6.1 Embedded Audit Modules (EAM)
EAMs are software modules that are built into application programs and are
specifically designed to continuously capture and monitor audit related
information (Groomer and Murthy, 1989). If a pre-programmed constraint is
violated an alert is generated, an auditor is informed, and transaction data is
saved in a file (Best et al., 2009; Debreceny et al., 2005; Groomer and Murthy,
1989; Weber 1999).
Weber (1999) describes EAMs as modules that are placed at specific points
within a system to gather material information about events or transactions.
EAMs are therefore intended to detect and capture data as transactions are
processed in the enterprise system. When a violation occurs the offending
transaction can either be rejected or allowed and an error is logged. ERP
systems are designed to process transactions efficiently and promptly. It is
therefore not practical to disallow every offending transaction from being
processed. Depending on the severity of the violation, some transactions could
be conditionally processed whilst others are rejected. The level of severity of
errors that would cause a transaction to be rejected needs to be negotiated and
accepted by the client organisation (Groomer and Murthy, 1989).
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6.2 Monitoring and Control Layer (MCL)
The Monitoring and Control Layer (MCL) introduced by Vasarhelyi et al.
(2004) is an alternative continuous monitoring and auditing approach to EAMs.
MCLs do not replace EAMs, instead they offer an alternative solution to cater
for different circumstances (Kuhn and Sutton, 2010). In this approach the
continuous monitoring and auditing system is separate from the client’s
enterprise system. MCLs are stand-alone systems that rely on comparisons of
extracted transaction data with pre-determined constraints that allow for
continuous monitoring of systems and identification of violations (Du and
Roohani, 2007).
The MCL primarily operates as a discrepancy-based audit monitoring tool, i.e.,
audit by exception (Vasarhelyi et al., 2004). The MCL continuously captures
enterprise data and analyses it to detect any deviations from the norm. When an
exception is detected, it is recorded. It will require further review by
compliance personnel in order to identify the underlying problem. These
further reviews are at the discretion of internal auditors.
In the next section, the study’s research propositions are developed.
7. RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS
To facilitate answering the study’s key research question, the following
research sub-questions and propositions have been formulated. Each of the
propositions directs attention to a specific issue that needs to be examined
within the scope its research sub-question. The propositions assist in directing
the study towards the desired outcome of answering the primary research
question and proving the conceptual model.
SQ1: How do enterprise systems support proactive detection of potential
fraud in financial transactions?
To answer this research sub-question, three propositions have been formulated.
RP1a: Enterprise system audit trails document adequate data to allow
retrospective monitoring of user activities.
RP1b: Violations in segregation of duties can be identified by analysing audit
trails for critical combinations of user activities.
RP1c: Potentially fraudulent transactions can be identified by investigating
user activities that violate segregation of duties, match known fraud symptoms,
or appear otherwise anomalous.
SQ2: How can detection of potential fraud in enterprise systems be
effectively and efficiently automated to ensure minimal auditor
interaction?
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To address this research sub-question, three propositions have been formulated.
RP2a: Software can be developed to identify potentially fraudulent activities
and report these using an intuitive visual interface.
RP2b: Threat monitoring and potential fraud detection can be implemented on
a stand-alone external computer system operating independently of an
organisation's enterprise system.
RP2c: Efficiency and effectiveness of the audit process can be improved by
using technology to perform continuous monitoring of an organisation's
enterprise system.
The next section examines the level of support enterprise systems provide for
proactive fraud detection.
8. ENTERPRISE SYSTEM SUPPORT FOR PROACTIVE FRAUD
DETECTION
Audit trails are records of users’ activities within an information system (Best,
2005; NIST, 2005). Audit trails are maintained by the operating system and
applications such as database systems and enterprise systems (Best et al.,
2004). The information captured in an audit trail is dependent on what events
are being audited by the system (SAP-AG, 2009). In conjunction with
appropriate tools and procedures, audit trails can assist in detecting fraudulent
activities. For example, an audit trail on a payment of a vendor invoice begins
with the receipt of the invoice. The invoice is tracked through accounts
payable, all the way through to payment in order to settle the debt (Tatum,
2010).
To detect fraudulent activities in an enterprise system, some fundamental data
is required. At a minimum, to detect fraud schemes listed in Table 3, an MCLbased application will require access to generic data items that define the event
(who, when, where, and how) as well as specific data items relating to each
scheme. Accordingly, this data should minimally include:







user name – name of the user that performed the transaction.
date – that the transaction was performed.
time – that the transaction was performed.
computer workstation – that the transaction was performed on.
transaction performed – the specific transaction that the user
performed (e.g., entering an invoice, posting a payment).
transaction details – data relating to the transaction performed (e.g.,
vendor bank details, invoice amount).
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8.1 SAP Enterprise System Audit Trails
SAP audit trails provide detailed descriptions of functions performed within an
enterprise system. Each function in SAP has a transaction code associated with
it. A transaction code (or tcode) consists of letters, numbers, or both (for
example, FB60–Enter Vendor Invoice). A transaction code is a shortcut that
takes the user directly to a SAP application rather than having to navigate
through the menu system (Padhi, 2010). Each transaction code executed by a
user is recorded in the audit trail (Best, 2000). The audit trail data required for
this study is stored in several tables within the SAP enterprise system.
Changes to master records are stored in two tables, CDHDR Change Document
Headers, and CDPOS Change Document Items (Best, 2005; Best et al., 2009;
Hirao, 2009; Padhi 2010). Changes to master records include creation and
deletion of master records and changes to fields. For every change document
number, there is a corresponding change document item in the CDPOS table.

Figure 3 SAP Audit Trails

Accounting audit trails are stored in tables BKPF–Accounting Document
Header, BSEG–Accounting Document Line Item, SKAT–General Ledger
Account Texts, and LFA1–Vendor General Data. Tables BKPF and BSEG
store posting histories for general ledger, and subsidiary ledger accounts. This
facilitates integration of data and automatic reconciliation of subsidiary ledgers
with reconciliation accounts. General ledger account texts (names) are stored in
table SKAT. Vendor general data including vendor name, date created and
creating user are stored in table LFA1.
8.2 Identifying Critical Combinations and Known Vendor Fraud
Symptoms
The segregation of duties (SoDs) principles previously discussed may be
detected in SAP by examining tcodes of functions performed by users. This
data allows association of actions with users'. A list of critical combination of
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activities a user has to perform in order to violate each of the SoDs principles is
shown in Table 4. If any of these violations are identified then further
investigation of an offending user's activities is necessary to determine whether
any fraudulent transactions have been performed.
Given the ability to identify violations in segregation of duties, it is feasible to
detect fraudulent transactions made possible by these violations. For example,
the ability to identify users who have changed vendor details, entered an
invoice and paid the invoice permits detection of vendor fraud. In addition,
further vendor fraud can be detected through examination of other anomalous
activities (Table 3).
Table 4 SAP Transaction Codes (adapted from SAP table TSTCT)
T-Code

SAP Description

Vendor Maintenance
FK01
Create Vendor (Accounting)
FK02
Change Vendor (Accounting)
XK01
Create Vendor (Centrally)
XK02
Change Vendor (Centrally)
Enter Invoice
FB60
Enter Vendor Invoice
F-43
Enter Vendor Invoice: Header Data
FB01
Post Document (allows posting of any financial transaction)
FB10
Invoice/Credit Memo Fast Entry
Post Payment
F-53
Post Outgoing Payment
F-58
Post Payment with Printout
F110
Automatic Payments

Data describing user activities is well-documented in the audit trails of SAP
enterprise systems. Analysing user activities for vendor fraud, however, is a
difficult task if done manually. Computer based data analytics can be used to
detect fraudulent activities that have already occurred, as well as determining
the propensity for frauds occurring in the future (Edge and Sampaio, 2009).
An automated methodology for vendor fraud detection is proposed and
developed in the next section.
9. AUTOMATING FRAUD DETECTION IN ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS
Modern integrated enterprise systems may record several thousands of
transactions daily. This enormous amount of transactions makes it difficult to
find a few instances of fraud among legitimate transactions. For large
organisations, this means monitoring hundreds of thousands of transactions and
then investigating suspicious ones in depth at considerable expense. A concern
often raised in the literature regarding continuous fraud detection systems
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relates to information overload (Alles et al., 2006; Alles et al., 2008; Kuhn and
Sutton, 2006). Simple detection of fraudulent activities is insufficient.
Approaches that reduce the burden of excessive information presented to an
auditor are more likely to contribute to the overall effectiveness of the audit
process. One method is to use visualisation to present information graphically
(Fetaji, 2011; Liang and Miranda, 2001). Visualisation is a general term used
to describe any technology that enable users to 'see' information in order to
help them better understand and put it in an appropriate context (GraphViz,
2010; TechTarget, 2010). Visualisation tools go beyond the standard charts and
graphs, displaying data in more sophisticated ways such as dials and gauges,
heat maps, tree maps and detailed bar and pie charts. Patterns, trends and
correlations that might go undetected in text-based data can be exposed and
recognised easier with visualisation. Details on how the prototype addresses
these issues are provided in the next section.
This study proposes a two-phase MCL-based strategy for detection of vendor
fraud in a SAP enterprise system. In phase one, transaction data is periodically
extracted from SAP. Data is extracted through the SAP data dictionary. The
following data are extracted:






Change document headers: extracted from table CDHDR to identify
transactions that violate SoDs.
Change document items: extracted from table CDPOS to identify
Insert (I) changes involving vendors, table LFBK, and field KEY.
Accounting document headers: extracted from table BKPF for
documents involving target user and transaction codes associated with
invoices and payments.
Accounting document line items: extracted from table BSEG for
postings involving target user and accounts payable general ledger
accounts.
Vendor general data: extracted from table LFA1 for identifying vendor
account information.

Phase two involves the analysis of extracted transaction data by a software
application. This occurs in two stages. Stage one consists of profiling users to
determine whether any violations in SoDs principles have occurred. In stage
two, transactions processed by these particular users may be investigated by
compliance personnel to determine whether any are fraudulent.
9.1 Prototype Development
A prototype is a partial or simplified implementation of a complete system
(Asur and Hufnagel 1993; Davis, 1992) built for a specific purpose such as:



formulating and evaluating requirements, specifications and designs.
demonstrating feasibility, system behaviour or performance.
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identifying and reducing risks of system mis-development.
communicating ideas, especially among diverse groups.
answering questions about specific properties of proposed systems
(Luqi and Steigerwald, 1992).

Two key advantages for constructing software prototypes relevant to this study
are (Asur and Hufnagel, 1993; Budde and Zullighoven, 1990):



to provide users with a 'tangible' idea of the problem solution being
sought after.
to demonstrate the technical feasibility of a specification.

The prototype is intended to demonstrate that the concept of proactive
detection of vendor fraud is feasible in practice. It is a limited version meant
for showcasing the concept and for testing purposes only. It produces a
combination of user- and vendor-centric reports and visualisations. A Fraud
Analytics Dashboard provides a high-level overview of activities performed in
the system (Figure 4). Transaction activities are summarised using pie and bar
charts (Figure 5) and link node diagrams (Figure 6). These presentation
methods augment standard text-based reports produced by the prototype and
support a reduction in information presented to an auditor.
These visualization methods serve to reduce the problem of information
overload by presenting voluminous information graphically.

Figure 4 Fraud Analytics Dashboard
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Figure 5 Benford's Law–Znalysis of Vendor Invoices

Figure 4 Visualization of Vendors Touched by User - USRARSCP
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9.2 Prototype Verification using Test Data
Software verification and validation is the process of checking that a software
system meets specifications and that it fulfils its intended purpose. It is a
disciplined approach to assessing software products that strives to ensure that
quality is built into the software and that it satisfies user requirements (IEEE,
2004; Wallace et al., 1996).
Verification is an attempt to ensure that the product is built correctly and that
the outputs of activities meet specifications imposed on them during the design
phase. Software verification looks for consistency, completeness, and
correctness of the software and its supporting documentation. Software testing
is one of many verification activities intended to confirm that software
development output meets its input requirements. Other verification activities
may include code and document inspections, walkthroughs, and other
techniques (USDoHHS, 1997).
The prototype is an Expert System intended to support a human expert in the
decision making process. It is based on computational rules and a knowledge
base. The power of the prototype is in the effectiveness and quality of the
knowledge it contains. To ensure quality, the knowledge base needs to be
verified. Potential problems can be grouped into (Cojocariu et al., 2005):



Consistency problems – caused by unnecessary conditions, redundant
or conflicting rules; and
Completeness problems – caused by missing rules, errors, or gaps in
the inference chains.

Verification of the prototype was achieved by performing a series of tests using
simulated test data involving simulated activity over a period of one month.
Initially, a series of “manual” experiments were performed on the test data to
establish control values. These experiments were performed using Microsoft
Excel. The same experiments were subsequently performed using the prototype
and the values produced were reconciled with the control values.
Inconsistencies in results were used to correct errors in the prototypes
computational rules and knowledge base. These tests served to assess whether
the software performed correctly, that it met the specifications imposed on it,
and to provide a demonstration of the potential use of the prototype.
Additional experiments were performed to determine the processing
capabilities of the prototype.
9.3 Analysis of Processing Times
A series of experiments were performed to determine whether the effectiveness
and efficiency of the audit process can be improved by using technology.
Experiments were performed using large and small data-sets. Processing time
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remained comparatively constant regardless of the size of the data-set (Table
5). Transaction data can be extracted, downloaded, and pre-processed in
approximately 40 minutes. An auditor then has the rest of the working day to
analyze the data and conduct further detailed investigations of users or
vendors. These tests indicate that auditor productivity may be improved when
using the prototype to support the audit process. Independent reviews and an
expert panel demonstration, discussed in the following section, provide further
evidence in support of this conclusion.
Table 5 Average Processing Time for All Tests

9.4 Analysis of Case Study Data using Prototype
Six months of actual transaction data was processed using the prototype. This
data was obtained from a large international manufacturing company. These
tests exposed the prototype to live data. [Data was also collected on processing
times]. A detailed trace of the processing of this data was generated. The scope
of analysis was as follows:
Organization:
System:
Module:
Fraud category:
Sub-category:
Transactions:
Analysis period:
SAP client:

(large international manufacturing company)
SAP ECC 5.0
Accounts Payable
Asset Misappropriation
Billing schemes, shell company schemes, nonaccomplice vendor schemes
Vendor invoices, vendor payments, maintenance of
vendor banking details
01/01/2011 to 30/06/2011
700
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Analysis procedures included:
User profiles:

Users are profiled to determine the scope of activities
they have performed. Activities include vendor
maintenance, invoicing and payment transactions.
Summary and detailed reports are produced.

Critical
combinations:

Users that violate segregation of duties are identified
and a report of potentially risky users is produced.

Activity analysis:

An individual user is identified from the risky users
list and selected for detailed investigation. Reports
documenting individual user activities are produced.

Vendor analysis:

A series of investigations are performed on active
vendors, including vendors sharing bank accounts,
vendors with multiple bank accounts, vendors with
multiple master records, and Benford’s law.

9.5 Summary of Findings from Case Study
ICT support staff performed functions of normal users including entering
invoices and paying vendors. This situation is not recommended as it violates
normal segregation of duties principles of: (a) separating users from SAP
support functions; and (b) separating entry of invoices/postings and payment
functions. This poses a considerable fraud risk and requires review.
Several postings were made using SAP transaction code FB01- Post
Document. It is generally recommended that users not use FB01 for entry of
transactions. This transaction code allows the user to post any financial
transaction including general ledger, customer, vendor, inventory, or asset
transactions. The user enters a document type (e.g., SA, for GL postings) as
part of the header data and then enters relevant data. Security guidelines
usually recommend that no user be granted access to this transaction code;
rather their profile should allow access to a set of specific transaction codes
associated with their position (e.g., an accounts payable clerk). This provides
proper segregation of duties.
Several users performed vendor maintenance, invoice entry, and payment
processing activities. These activities violate segregation of duties principles.
Roles of all users that have performed these activities require review and
appropriate restrictions ought to be applied to their SAP profiles.
Several postings with round dollar amounts were identified. Round dollar
values have a higher probability of being fraudulent (Wells, 2011, p. 113).
These transactions require review to determine whether they are genuine.
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It was observed that several vendors were sharing bank accounts. These appear
to involve vendors with multiple vendor numbers for the same vendor. These
vendors should be examined to check that they are genuine. There were also
several vendors with multiple bank accounts. These appear to involve vendors
with multiple master records. Duplicate vendor master records are a potential
fraud risk and should be eliminated. It is recommended that the vendor master
file be periodically cleaned.
Several cases of flipping banking details were observed. Flipping occurs when
a vendor’s payment details are temporarily changed, a payment is made, and
banking details are changed back to the original. This may be indicative of
fraud where the fraudster redirects payments to their personal bank account.
These transactions should be examined by internal audit to ensure that changes
were authorized.
Benford’s Law gives expected frequencies of digits in numerical data. Contrary
to belief, digits are not equally likely and are biased towards lower digits.
Benford's Law analysis of the first two digits for vendor invoices revealed
large spikes at 11, 22, 27, 36, 45, 54, and 67. Spikes also occurred at 22, 27,
36, 37, and 45 for vendor payments. Other smaller spikes were also observed
for invoices and payments. Large spikes are indicative of potential fraud. These
transactions require further examination to determine whether they are genuine.
9.6 Comments on Findings from Case Study
It should be noted that in organizations with Accounts Payable sections having
small numbers of staff, complete segregation of duties may not be feasible.
These organizations may implement other compensating manual processes that
safeguard against inappropriate activity. However, SAP support staff roles
should be quite distinct from normal user roles, given they can also create
dummy user accounts. If they run batch jobs to process large volumes on
behalf of users, there should be manual processes for approving and reviewing
these jobs.
The results of the case study analysis require close examination by internal
audit to determine whether these vulnerabilities/anomalies were actually
associated with fraudulent activities.
In the next section, the prototype is reviewed by independent auditing
practitioners in order to determine that it is the right product and that it fulfils
its purpose.
10. PROTOTYPE VALIDATION
Validation is an attempt to ensure that the right product is built and that the
product fulfils its specific intended purpose. Validation therefore is the
confirmation by examination and provision of objective evidence that software
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specifications conform to user needs and intended uses, and that the particular
requirements implemented through software can be consistently fulfilled.
Validation includes useability testing and user feedback.
Validation of the prototype was achieved by obtaining independent reviews
from auditing practitioners. In each case, the reviewer(s) were provided with a
summary paper (Singh et al., 2011), a one-hour presentation, and
demonstration of the prototype. The demonstration involved processing and
analysing using both simulated test data and actual transaction data.
Feedback was requested on the following issues [results are discussed in
Section 10.1]:
a) The importance of such a project for auditing in an organisation.
b) The role that automated fraud detection software could play as an
auditing tool for internal auditors.
c) The desirability of a retrospective analysis software tool implemented
on a standalone computer system as compared with a system
embedded within an enterprise system.
d) The functionality of the prototype, in particular the user interface,
reporting and graphical features.
e) Further comments or suggestions for improvement to the prototype.
Feedback was also obtained from a panel of experts. They were also provided
with a summary paper, a one-hour presentation, and demonstration of the
prototype. Their feedback was sought using a survey on key issues including:
operation, reporting and visualisations, accuracy & efficiency, and impact on
auditor productivity.
10.1 Independent Review and Expert Panel Feedback
Three independent reviewers provided feedback on the prototype. The first
review was conducted by the Executive Director–Information Systems Audit
of a top international accounting firm, based in Australia. His comments are
given below:
A project of this nature is considered to be of high importance
to organisations. It provides a mechanism to pro-actively
monitor fraud risk, a key risk in any organisation. It also
demonstrates a commitment to compliance with Corporate
Governance Principles and Recommendations as outlined by
ASX Corporate Governance Council.
Automated fraud detection software can provide internal
auditors with a tool to efficiently assess the presence of fraud
within an organization. This may also be applied to testing the
effectiveness of the controls that management may have in
place. A tool of this nature can ensure that the management of
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the risk of fraud can be undertaken on a more regular or
continual basis.
In general, I found the functionality of the tool to be useful.
The user interface would require a minimal level of training
and some level of understanding of the SAP application, which
is a reasonable constraint. The graphs and visualizations
clearly communicated a message for the reader. The speed of
running the queries was impressive.
The other two reviewers (both senior management executives in an
international manufacturing company) provided equally supportive comments
and also felt that the prototype should be further extended to other areas
including accounts receivable, fixed assets, and general ledger.
Expert Panel members were provided with a survey instrument and asked to
rate key issues on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Twenty-three responses were received. Results are discussed below.
Operation. Panel members rated the prototype as being easy to use, userfriendly, and providing adequate on-screen instructions (Table 6).
Table 6 Operation of Prototype
Operation
(Questionnaire scale 1 to 7)
Easy to use
User-friendly
Navigation of user interface is simple
Onscreen instructions/ help is adequate
Data entry is straightforward

Mean

Variance

Std Dev.

5.87
5.78
5.65
5.78
5.70

0.45
0.45
0.60
0.36
0.40

0.81
0.67
0.78
0.60
0.63

N=23

Reports and visualisations. Panel members rated reports as being easy to
understand, useful in identifying potential fraud and in aggregating enormous
amount of information. Visualisations were also seen as enabling identification
of relationships or patterns in data that would otherwise be difficult in textual
data. Overall, the group rated reports and visualisations as important tools in a
fraud investigator's toolkit (Tables 7 and 8).
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Table 7 Reports
Reports
(Questionnaire scale 1 to 7)
Easy to understand
Contains adequate information
Helpful in identifying potential fraud
Are an important tool in a fraud investigators toolkit
N=23

Mean

Variance

Std Dev.

5.91
5.87
6.22
6.17

0.63
0.48
0.36
0.33

0.79
0.69
0.60
0.58

Table 8 Visualisations
Visualisations (charts & diagrams)
(Questionnaire scale 1 to 7)
Easy to understand
Useful in aggregating an enormous amount of
information
Enables effective exploration of data in a graphical
format
Enables identification of relationships or patterns in
data that are otherwise difficult to do in textual data
Enhances investigation and analysis for potential fraud
Are an innovative way of presenting information
Are an important tool in a fraud investigators toolkit
N=23

Mean

Variance

Std Dev.

5.87

0.87

0.92

6.09

0.54

0.73

6.13

0.57

0.76

6.17

0.60

0.78

6.22
6.35
6.04

0.54
0.42
0.77

0.74
0.65
0.88

Accuracy, efficiency and performance. The prototype was rated as producing
quality, useful and accurate results. Panel members agreed that the prototype
was an improvement over basic analytical tools and results were produced in a
much faster time than if done manually. They also felt that there was potential
to save costs and reduce future fraud by early detection of suspicious user
activities (Table 9).
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Table 9 Accuracy, Efficiency and Performance
Accuracy, Efficiency and Performance
(Questionnaire scale 1 to 7)

Mean

Variance

Std Dev.

5.96

0.50

0.71

6.09
6.00

0.36
0.55

0.60
0.74

6.35

0.42

0.65

5.96

0.59

0.77

5.87

0.30

0.55

6.13

0.39

0.63

6.22

0.45

0.67

Produces quality results that are useful in
identifying potential fraud
Results are accurate and dependable
Produces the same results as a human expert
Generates results much faster than doing a similar
task manually
Is an improvement over basic analysis as it
replaces blind querying of data with contextual
analysis
Significantly enhances the internal auditing process
Potential to save costs due to improved fraud
detection
Potential to reduce future fraud by early detection
of suspect user activity
N=23

Auditor productivity. Panel members collectively agreed that the prototype
may reduce time taken to identify potential fraud (Table 10). They were asked
to rate the number of person days it would take to review a system for fraud
based on 30,000 transactions. Their responses are shown in Tables 11 to 13.
Table 10 Visualisations
Auditor Productivity
(Questionnaire scale 1 to 7)
This software may reduce time taken to identify
potential fraud in an organisation
N=23

Mean

Variance

Std Dev.

6.30

0.49

0.70

Panel members generally agreed that it would take 20+ days (39.1%) or it
would be an impractical task (60.9%) to audit the stated number of
transactions, if done manually (Table 11).
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Table 11 Time to Process Manually
Q 4.1a
Value (days)
Count
%
How long would it take to review for fraud, if done
manually?
Impractical

Less than 1

U

14

60.9%

20+

9

39.1%

10

0

0.0%

5

0

0.0%

3

0

0.0%

1

0

0.0%

<1

0

0.0%

N=23

Panel members agreed that it would take between 1 and 20+ days to audit the
stated number of transactions using other software (e.g., ACL, Access, and
Excel) (Table 12).
Table 12 Time to Process with Other Software
Q 4.1b
Value (days)
Count
%
How long would it take to review for fraud, if done
using other software?
Impractical

Less than 1

U

0

0.0%

20+

8

34.8%

10

9

39.1%

5

3

13.0%

3

1

4.3%

1

2

8.7%

<1

0

0.0%

N=23

Panel members agreed that it would take between <1 to 5 days to audit the
stated number of transactions using the prototype. Most agreed that 3 days
(43.5%) was standard, 21.7% said 1 day and 17.4% said either 5 days or <1
day (Table 13). From these ratings, it may be concluded that using the
prototype as a tool for detection of potential fraud improves auditor
productivity.
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Table 13 Time to Process with Prototype
Q 4.1c
Value (days)
Count
%
How long would it take to review for fraud, if done
using the prototype software?
Impractical

U

0

0.0%

20+

0

0.0%

10

0

0.0%

5

4

17.4%

3

10

43.5%

1

5

21.7%

<1

4

17.4%

Less than 1

N=23

Overall evaluation. Panel members considered the prototype a useful auditing
tool that represented substantial advances over other tools currently available
in the market. They are likely to use or recommend this tool should it be
commercially available (Table 14).
Table 14 Overall evaluation
Overall Evaluation
(Questionnaire scale 1 to 7)
This software represents substantial advances over
other tools currently available in the market
If available, I am likely to use this software
If available, I am likely to recommend this software
to others
Overall, this software is a useful auditing tool
N=23

Mean

Variance

Std Dev.

5.96

0.41

0.64

5.70
6.04

0.68
0.59

0.82
0.77

6.22

0.72

0.85

The findings and contributions of this study need to be considered within its
limitations. These limitations and recommendations for future research are
discussed next.
11. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The first limitation of this study is that there is insufficient access to data to
determine the level of fraud prevalent in organisations. Many frauds that occur
are handled quietly by the victim organisations as they are more concerned
about the embarrassment of making frauds public and the costs associated with
fraud investigations. Consequently, organisations with and without fraud
experiences are not prepared to provide access to their transaction data. This
situation is confirmed in a survey conducted by AuditNet (2011) where it was
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found that one of the 10 key challenges for data analytics is the difficulty of
getting data to perform analyses. Therefore, the single case study approach was
adopted for this study. Future research could extend this study by replication in
other organisations locally and internationally to test whether the same findings
are observed or not.
The second limitation of this study is the generalisability of results is limited.
The focus of this study is on a single category of occupational fraud, namely,
asset misappropriation. Within asset misappropriation, the study focuses on
billing fraud schemes involving shell companies and non-accomplice vendors
in accounts payable. This limits identification of potential threats or frauds.
Generalising the findings to other categories of fraud (such as accounts
receivable) therefore must be made with caution. Extending the focus of the
catalogue of fraud symptoms and fraud detection algorithms developed in this
study to include other fraud schemes will extend identification of potential
threats or frauds.
12. CONCLUSION
Fraud is a global problem that continues to grow annually. Results from the
ACFE (2012) Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse
highlights the significance and pervasiveness of the fraud problem. The Report
concluded that the projected annual loss due to fraud is approximately $3.5
trillion. Furthermore an AuditNet survey (2012) of more than 1500 auditors
concluded that the use of data analytics tools and techniques are not being
maximized in routine audit activities. Therefore the financial impact of fraud
appears to be increasing yet resources and technology are not being effectively
deployed to address the problem. Enhancing the ability of organizations to
detect potential fraud may have a positive impact on the economy. An effective
model that facilitates proactive detection of potential fraud may potentially
save costs and reduce the propensity of future fraud by early detection of
suspicious user activities.
Enterprise systems generate hundreds of thousands to millions of transactions
annually. The enormous amount of generated transactions makes it difficult to
find few potentially fraudulent instances among legitimate transactions.
Without the availability of proactive fraud detection tools, investigating
suspicious activities becomes overwhelming.
Using the Design-Science framework, this study has established that:



enterprise system audit trails document adequate data to allow
retrospective monitoring of user activities (RP1a).
violations in segregation of duties can be identified by analysing audit
trails for critical combinations of user activities (RP1b).
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potentially fraudulent transactions can be identified by investigating
user activities that violate segregation of duties, match known fraud
symptoms, or appear otherwise anomalous (RP1c).
software can be developed to identify potentially fraudulent activities
and report these using an intuitive visual interface (RP2a).
threat monitoring and potential fraud detection can be implemented on
a stand-alone external computer system based on the MCL approach
(RP2b.
efficiency and effectiveness of the audit process can be improved by
using technology to perform continuous monitoring (RP2c).

This study has demonstrated the feasibility of implementing proactive vendor
fraud detection in enterprise systems.
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